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APPENDIX  
Define the self-interested payoffs for the high piece-rate player (henceforth h) and the low piece-
rate players (henceforth l) as follows: 
A1)    	 
 and    	 
, 
where   0;    0; 
  0;  
  0;     0.  
Let   0 and   0 be the effort levels that maximize  and  respectively. Since the payoff 
functions are strictly concave, these optimal self-interested effort levels are unique. Moreover, 
since as shown in the text,   , and   , it follows that  	   0. In the 
discussion that follows, we assume that the three l players behave identically in equilibrium and 
care only about inequity with respect to h. 
Model 1: Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion  
Suppose there is disadvantageous inequity aversion based on differences in monetary income as 
described in the text. Then: 
A2)    	  	  if  	   0; 
    if  	   0, and 
A3)    	  	  if  	   0; 
              if  	   0,  
where  is the sensitivity of h to disadvantageous inequity with respect to the l players and  is 
the sensitivity of l to disadvantageous inequity with respect to the h player.  
Define  such that  	   0.
1
 Then  	   0 implies that    
because .  is a strictly increasing function.  
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 We assume that  exists. If this is not the case, the equilibrium and the reasoning used to prove its existence is 
analogous to that used in the case of ̃    (Case 1 below). 
Suppose h’s effort is  . What is l’s optimal effort? Note that    implies that given  ,  
strictly dominates any effort    for l. This is because l reduces his/her self-interested payoff 
without getting any benefit from the inequity aversion component of his/her payoff if s/he chooses 
   instead of . Hence given     for h, the optimal effort for l must lie in the interval [0, 
]. This means that l’s problem is reduced to choosing  to maximize the strictly concave 
function  	  	  subject to   0, , where the objective function is 
everywhere differentiable in this case. Accordingly, we solve the first-order condition ̃ 

̃  0 to obtain ̃. It is easy to show that ̃   as we do in the text of the paper. If 
̃  , then ̃ is l’s optimal effort. If ̃  , then l’s optimal effort is . 
We will consider the two possible cases: 
Case 1:  ̃  , 
Case 2: ̃  . 
Case 1: ̃ is l’s optimal effort. Claim: ̂  ̃ and ̂    is a Nash equilibrium. Proof:  Based on 
the previous analysis, it is clear that l does not have any profitable deviations. What about h? If h 
increases or decreases effort, s/he moves away from his/her self-interested maximum, without any 
compensating benefit from the inequity aversion component of his/her utility function, thus 
becoming worse off. Thus, ̂  ̃ and ̂    is a Nash equilibrium. 
Is this equilibrium unique? Suppose there were an equilibrium with     to which the l players 
responded optimally. If in that conjectured equilibrium, l’s income were less than or equal to h’s 
income, h would gain by increasing  toward his/her self-interested maximum,  . Moreover, if 
l’s income were greater than h’s income, h would gain by increasing  both because s/he would 
move closer to his/her self-interested maximum and because s/he would reduce disadvantageous 
inequity. Hence there is no such equilibrium.  
Suppose there were an equilibrium with     to which the l players responded optimally. 
Notice that     and ̃   together imply       ̃ since v(.) 
is a strictly increasing function. Thus, the optimal response for l would still be ̃ since h’s income 
must be higher than l’s income in this conjectured equilibrium. The h player would therefore gain 
by reducing effort to  , thus maximizing his/her self-interested utility without any offsetting loss 
from the inequity-aversion component of his/her utility function. Hence there is no such 
equilibrium. Thus, if ̃  , the equilibrium in which ̂  ̃ and ̂    is unique. 
Case 2: Now consider the case where ̃  . Claim: ̂   and ̂    is a Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: Based on the previous analysis, it is clear that l does not have any profitable deviations. 
What about h? If h increases or decreases effort, s/he moves away from his/her self-interested 
maximum, without any compensating benefit from the inequity aversion component of his/her 
utility function, thus becoming worse off. Thus, ̂   and ̂    is a Nash equilibrium. 
Is this equilibrium unique? Suppose there were an equilibrium with     to which l responded 
optimally. Define ̆ such that ̆   . Note that ̆   because ̆    

   and .  is a strictly increasing function. Moreover, recall that   ̃ in this 
case. Thus, ̆    ̃ . Then an analysis similar to the derivation of the equilibrium where 
̂  

 above shows that l’s optimal response would be ̆. However, h would then gain by 
deviating because s/he can increase his/her effort to his/her self-interested optimal effort level,  , 
without any offsetting loss from the inequity-aversion component of his/her utility function. 
Therefore, such an equilibrium cannot exist. 
Suppose there were an equilibrium with     to which l responded optimally. An analysis 
similar to the derivation of the equilibrium where ̂    above shows that such a response will 
result in two possibilities for l. Define ̆ such that ̆   . Then if ̃  ̆, l will 
choose ̃. In that case, l’s income would be less than h’s income. This cannot be a Nash 
equilibrium because h can gain by deviating downwards, thereby moving closer to his/her self-
interested maximum   without suffering any loss from the inequity aversion component of his/her 
utility function.2 In contrast, if ̃  ̆, l will choose ̆. Notice that in this case l’s income is equal 
to h’s income. I argue below that if  is sufficiently large, this will be a Nash equilibrium. 
Consider then the candidate equilibrium where ̂      and because ̃  ̆, ̂  ̆. Given 
h’s choice, l is optimizing, so l will not gain by deviating. Consider possible deviations for h, 
given l’s choice of ̆. h will lose by deviating upwards such that     because s/he is moving 
farther away from his/her self-interested maximum     without any compensating benefit 
from changes in disadvantageous inequity. However, the situation is more complicated if h 
deviates by reducing effort such that    . Notice that such a deviation implies that h’s income 
falls below l’s income. Such a deviation represents a gain from the self-interested part of h’s utility 
function, while simultaneously representing a loss from the other-regarding part of his/her utility 
function because it causes h to begin experiencing disadvantageous inequity. Since the 
disadvantageous inequity parameter  is assumed only to be greater than 0, it can be arbitrarily 
large. Thus, it is possible that the loss from the disadvantageous inequity part of the utility 
function exceeds the gain from the self-interested part of the utility function if  is sufficiently 
large. If so, ̂  ̆ and ̂    is a Nash equilibrium.  
Notice that any such equilibrium is Pareto inferior to the equilibrium where ̂   and ̂   . 
This is because in neither equilibrium are there any inequity considerations since ̂  ̂ in 
both cases. However, in the latter equilibrium, both l and h are closer to their self-interested 
maxima. Thus, if the h and the l players were to move simultaneously from the equilibrium where 
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 Note that moving all the way to  would not necessarily be a profitable deviation. However, it will always be 
profitable to deviate to some  such that      . We will show in the next paragraph that it is possible for a 
Nash equilibrium where    to exist. 
̂  ̆ and ̂    to the equilibrium where ̂   and ̂   , they would all be better off. 
 
Model 2: Disadvantageous and Advantageous Inequity Aversion 
Suppose the existence of both disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversion based on 
differences in monetary income. Then: 
 A4)    	  	  if  	   0; 
     ! 	  if  	   0, and 
A5)    	  	  if  	   0; 
     ! 	  if  	   0. 
where ! is the sensitivity of h to advantageous inequity with respect to the l players and ! is the 
sensitivity of l to advantageous inequity with respect to the h player, and  and  are as 
previously defined. Following Fehr and Schmidt, !"  " where #  $, %. 
Let ̃ be the effort level that maximizes  and ̃ be the effort level that maximizes  when 
 	   0. Specifically, ̃ is the solution to ̃  ̃  0, while ̃ is the 
solution to  ̃ 	 !̃  0. Note that as demonstrated in the text, ̃  . An 
analogous argument implies ̃   . Define & such that & 	 ̃  03 and & such 
that & 	 ̃  0. Note that ̃  & implies &  ̃.4 We will consider three 
possible cases that depend on the relationship between , ̃, and & and the relationship between 


, ̃, and &: 
Case 1:   ̃  &, which implies &  ̃   . 
Case 2:   &  ̃ and ̃  &   . 
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 Again, we assume that & exists. Otherwise the same reasoning as in Case 1 below applies. 
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 Both follow directly from the relationship between ̃, the monetary income of l if s/he were to exert ̃ units of 
effort, and ̃ , the monetary income of h if s/he were to exert ̃ units of effort. In particular, ̃  
̃  implies both ̃  & and &  ̃. Note that at this point we are not making any claims about the 
relationship between  and  in equilibrium. 
Case 3: &    ̃ and/or ̃    &. 
Case 1: First, consider the case where   ̃  &, which implies &  ̃  . Claim: ̂  ̃ 
and ̂  ̃ is a Nash equilibrium. Proof:  Consider possible deviations. If h increases effort, s/he 
moves closer to his/her optimal self-interested level of effort, but incurs additional disutility from 
advantageous inequity. The latter effect dominates, making h worse off, since h is moving away 
from ̃, the effort level that maximizes utility given this tradeoff. If h decreases effort, s/he moves 
farther away from his/her optimal self-interested level of effort, while simultaneously reducing the 
disutility from advantageous inequity. The former effect dominates because h is moving away 
from ̃, the effort level that maximizes utility given this tradeoff. Moreover, if h’s effort level 
falls below &, h is not only farther away from his/her self-interested optimum, but is also 
incurring disadvantageous inequity. On both counts, s/he is worse off. Thus such a deviation 
cannot be profitable. If l increases effort, but his/her effort remains below &, s/he loses because 
s/he is moving above ̃, the optimal effort level taking account of the tradeoff between the gain 
from the reduction in disadvantageous inequity and the loss from moving farther away from 
his/her optimal self-interested effort level, . If l increases effort so much that his/her effort 
exceeds &, s/he is also worse off. This is because s/he is both moving farther away from his/her 
self-interested optimal effort level and incurring increasing advantageous inequity with respect to 
h. Similarly, if l decreases effort, s/he is decreasing income below ̃, implying that any possible 
gain from moving closer to the self-interested maximum is dominated by the loss stemming from 
the increase in disadvantageous inequity with respect to h. Thus, ̂  ̃ and ̂  ̃ is a Nash 
equilibrium. 
Is this equilibrium unique? Suppose there were an equilibrium with   ̃    to which the l 
players responded optimally. Define ( such that ( 	    0. If ̃  (, l would 
choose ̃ as in the original equilibrium. Since ̃  (, this implies that ̃ 	    0 in 
the candidate equilibrium. The h player would then gain by increasing  to his/her other-
regarding maximum, ̃, which takes account of the tradeoff between the benefit of moving closer 
to his/her self-interested maximum,  , and the loss from the increase in advantageous inequity in 
this region. If ̃  (  , l would choose (. His/her income would be equal to h’s income. The h 
player would again gain by increasing  to his/her other-regarding maximum, ̃, which takes 
account of the tradeoff between the benefit of moving closer to his/her self-interested maximum, 


, and the loss from the increase in advantageous inequity in this region. Finally, if ̃    (, 
l would choose a level of effort between (, where there is no adverse effect from inequity and , 
his/her self-interested maximum. Thus, l’s income would be greater than or equal to h’s income. In 
this case, h would again gain by increasing  to ̃. As long as h’s monetary income were less 
than l’s monetary income, h would be moving closer to his/her self-interested maximum without 
any adverse effects from the inequity-aversion component of his/her utility function. After 
achieving income equality, h would continue to gain by moving all the way to ̃, the maximum 
that takes account of the tradeoff between the self-interested and other-regarding component of the 
utility function in this region. Hence there is no such equilibrium. 
Suppose there were an equilibrium with   ̃ to which the l players responded optimally. The 
optimal response for l would still be ̃ since h’s income must be higher than l’s income in this 
conjectured equilibrium. The h player would gain by reducing effort to ̃, thus maximizing 
his/her utility. Hence there is no such equilibrium. Thus, if   ̃  &, implying &  ̃   , 
and ̃  ̃, the equilibrium in which ̂  ̃ and ̂  ̃ is unique. 
Case 2: Now consider the case in which   &  ̃ and ̃  &   . Claim: ̂  ̃ and 
̂  &  is a Nash equilibrium. Proof: Consider possible deviations. If h chooses a lower , s/he 
both incurs disadvantageous inequity and moves farther away from his/her self-interested 
maximum. If s/he chooses a higher , s/he moves away from ̃, his/her optimal level of effort 
taking into account the tradeoff between the gain from the self-interested component and the loss 
from the advantageous inequity component of his/her utility function. Thus s/he is worse off. If l 
chooses a higher , s/he loses because s/he both moves farther away from his/her self-interested 
maximum and incurs advantageous inequity. If s/he chooses a lower , s/he is moving farther 
away from ̃, the optimal level of effort taking into account the tradeoff between the gain from the 
self-interested component and the loss from the disadvantageous inequity component of his/her 
utility function. Thus s/he is worse off. Thus, ̂  ̃ and ̂  & is a Nash equilibrium. We will 
call it Nash equilibrium A. 
This Nash equilibrium is not unique. For example, ̂  & and ̂  ̃ is also a Nash equilibrium. 
We will call it Nash Equilibrium B. Consider possible deviations from this equilibrium. If h moves 
down, s/he is moving farther away from his/her self-interested maximum,  , and incurs 
disadvantageous inequity, and is thus worse off. If h moves up, s/he moves farther away from ̃, 
the optimal level of effort reflecting the tradeoff between the gain from the self-interested 
component and the loss from the advantageous inequity component of his/her utility function. 
Thus, s/he is worse off. If l moves up, s/he moves farther away from his/her self-interested 
maximum, , and incurs advantageous inequity. If l moves down, s/he moves away from ̃, the 
optimal level of effort reflecting the tradeoff between the gain from the self-interested component 
and the loss from the disadvantageous inequity component of his/her utility function. Thus, s/he is 
worse off. 
Note that these two equilibria are not Pareto rankable. In both equilibria A and B, neither h nor l 
suffers from inequity since monetary incomes are equal. In A, h is farther away from   than in B. 
Thus, s/he is worse off in A. Conversely, l is closer to  in A than in B. Hence, s/he is better off in 
A. 
Note also that there are many other equilibria in between A and B, i.e. in between income levels 
̃  & and ̃  & with  between ̃ and & and  between & and ̃ 
such that incomes of h and l are equal. The argument regarding defections stated above for 
equilibria A and B applies to all of them. These equilibria are not Pareto-rankable. As efforts and 
incomes rise, h is better off and l is worse off.  
Case 3: Now consider the case where &  ̃ and ̃  & as in Case 2, but where either &   
̃ and/or ̃    &. 
The Nash equilibria between income levels  and  are exactly as described above.  
However, depending on the specific parameters of the utility functions, there could be additional 
equilibria. For example, there could be equilibria where there is income equality at an income 
level below , but greater than or equal to &. For h, the same defection arguments 
apply as before. If l moves down, the argument is the same as before. However, if l moves up, s/he 
gains by moving closer to his/her optimal self-interested effort level, , but loses from the 
advantageous inequity resulting from his/her higher income level. If the second effect dominates 
the first effect, this is a Nash equilibrium. In contrast to the equilibria discussed so far, it predicts a 
drop rather than a rise in effort for l when s/he learns about h’s higher piece rate. However, any 
such potential equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium where ̂   and ̂  , 
where  is defined as the level of effort such that   . This is because if all 
players simultaneously move, there are no inequity implications since incomes remain equal. 
However, l is moving to his/her optimal self-interested effort level, , and h is moving closer to 
his/her optimal self-interested effort level,  . Thus, if the h and the l players were to move 
simultaneously from such an equilibrium to the equilibrium where ̂   and ̂  , they 
would all be better off. 
 An analogous argument can be made for potential equilibria at income levels above , but 
less than or equal to &. 
 
  
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
The following instructions were originally written and employed in Chinese and German. This is 
an English translation of the instructions for the unequal piece-rate information (UPRI) treatment. 
Instructions for the other treatments are analogous. 
 
Instructions – English Translation  
You are now attending an economics experiment. Please read the following instructions 
carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. Please do not communicate with other 
participants during the experiment.  
 
You can earn a considerable amount of money, depending on your performance in the 
experiment. At the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned to a group of four at random. 
Such a group assignment will remain the same till the end of the experiment. However, each of 
you will work independently and your earnings will ONLY depend on your own performance. 
You will remain anonymous throughout the experiment and nobody will be able to link your 
performance with either you or your name.  
 
During the experiment, please pay attention to the information panel on the left side of the 
computer screen. Important information (e.g. your earnings for each phase and each round) will be 
shown there. There will be 10 rounds in the experiment.  
 
In order to make sure that you understand the rules of the experiment, we will first have a 
trial round before we proceed. If you have any question, please raise your hand. You will not make 
any money for the trial round.  
 
[In Rounds 1-5, the computer screen will show that the subject will earn 0.06/0.24 for each 
correct answer submitted and his/her cumulative earnings]. 
 
[At the beginning of Round 6, the computer screen will show the following message while 
the experimenter will also read aloud this message to everyone in the session: In this experiment, 
you were assigned to a group of four at random. All of you have identical questions to answer and 
the same time period for each phase. However, at the very beginning of the experiment, one of the 
group members was randomly chosen to earn 0.24 Yuan per correct answer submitted, which is 4 
times as high as the rest of the group members’ earnings, namely 0.06 Yuan per correct answer 
submitted. Such a piece-rate remains the same for a given subject for all 10 rounds in the 
experiment.] 
 
[In Rounds 6-10, the computer screen will show that a subject will earn 0.06/0.24 for each 
correct answer submitted]. 
 
 
 
 
